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‘A Tempest in a Teapot’: Canadian Military
Planning and the St. Pierre and Miquelon
Affair, 1940-1942
THE SMALL FRENCH COLONY OF ST. PIERRE AND MIQUELON, located
some 32 kilometers off the south shore of Newfoundland, was a source of great
concern for the Canadian government during the Second World War.1 When Nazi
Germany defeated France in June 1940, the fate of the French Empire became
uncertain. Canada and other Allied countries feared that French colonies might be
used by the Germans to conduct military operations against them. The proximity of
St. Pierre and Miquelon to Canada and the British colony of Newfoundland
constituted a major threat. Negotiations immediately ensued between the American,
British and Canadian governments as to the future of France’s territories in the
Western Hemisphere. The main argument was whether or not the French islands
needed to be occupied by Allied military forces. The issue, however, was solved in
December 1941 when the Free French movement of General Charles de Gaulle sent a
small naval task force to rally the archipelago to the Allied cause. Most historians who
have analyzed the St. Pierre and Miquelon affair of 1940 to 1942 have focused upon
the Free French takeover. Although some historians have studied Canada’s role in the
affair from a diplomatic perspective, none have provided an in-depth analysis of
Canadian military planning during this crisis.2 It is now clear that Canada undertook
significant planning to launch an invasion. An understanding of the details of
Canada’s invasion plan and the ultimate decision to postpone military action
illuminates the changing structure of Canada’s relations with Great Britiain and the
United States.
The islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon are located in the Cabot Strait west of
Newfoundland’s Burin Peninsula. They have a total area of only 242 square
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kilometers and consist of three main islands: St. Pierre, Grande Miquelon and
Langlade – also known as Petite Miquelon. The archipelago is the remnant of
France’s old North American Empire. Under the terms of the 1763 Treaty of Paris,
which was signed in the immediate aftermath of the Seven Years War, France was
granted permission to retain St. Pierre and Miquelon as compensation for the loss of
New France. Great Britain insisted, however, that the islands be demilitarized and
used solely for fishery purposes. It is important to note that possession of St. Pierre
and Miquelon offered France privileged access to the prolific fisheries of the Grand
Banks. Despite the removal of the British military restrictions twenty years later,
Great Britain and France assured each other of their determination to prevent St.
Pierre and Miquelon from becoming “an object of jealousy between the two nations”.
Although French sovereignty was challenged on several occasions over the years, St.
Pierre and Miquelon remained virtually undefended on the eve of the Second World
War, possessing neither fortifications nor a garrison. The French colony’s population
of approximately 4,400 depended almost entirely on French maritime power for
security. Administered by the Ministère des Colonies in Paris in conjunction with a
local governor and administrative council, St. Pierre and Miquelon always maintained
a strong sense of loyalty to metropolitan France.3 Never was this faithfulness more
tested than when German armed forces invaded northern France in early June 1940. 
The sudden defeat of the French armies, which was followed by the conclusion of
an armistice with Nazi Germany on 22 June 1940, came as a shock throughout the
French Empire. Concerns over the future of France’s overseas territories increasingly
divided colonial governors between those anxious to fight on and support the Free
French movement of General Charles de Gaulle, which had been created in London
on 18 June, and those loyal to the new French government of Marshal Henri-Philippe
Pétain, established in Vichy, Central France. When Governor Gilbert de Bournat of
St. Pierre and Miquelon recognized the legitimacy of the Vichy government, Allied
authorities became worried. The problem was that Vichy France, although neutral in
theory, was nothing more than a German satellite. The Allies feared that the new
regime in France might eventually collaborate militarily with Nazi Germany. The pro-
Vichy attitudes of the colonial administration in St. Pierre and Miquelon meant that
Canada and Newfoundland, at war against Germany since early September 1939,
suddenly faced a potentially hostile territory almost within sight of their shores.4
The Canadian government perceived St. Pierre and Miquelon as a threat for several
reasons. At the time of France’s capitulation, Ottawa was becoming more and more
preoccupied with the fate of European possessions in the Western Hemisphere and
feared that Nazi Germany might use the overseas territories of recently conquered
countries such as Denmark, the Netherlands and France to conduct military operations
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against the Allies. With German submarines roaming the North Atlantic, the Canadian
government began to consider the possibility that the enemy might use St. Pierre and
Miquelon as an advance base. The French colony’s proximity to Canada and
Newfoundland could offer German submariners an excellent position to re-supply and
coordinate attacks upon Allied convoys. The Canadian authorities were also
concerned with the presence in the islands of the old 1,200-ton French armed sloop
Ville d’Ys, which local authorities used to patrol the Grand Banks. The fact that Vichy
France operated a warship so close to Allied shipping lanes was deemed to be
intolerable by Ottawa.5 Tension arose as well over St. Pierre and Miquelon’s role in
terms of intercontinental communications. The problem was that the colony was able
to communicate with metropolitan France by means of its short wave wireless
transmitting station, transatlantic cables and the high-powered radios aboard French
deep-sea fishing trawlers operating along the Grand Banks. Ottawa feared that Vichy
supporters in the archipelago could transmit vital information to France and inform
German submarine crews about meteorological conditions, the movements of Allied
warships and the progression of convoys. There was also the possibility that the
islanders might tap or cut some of the transatlantic cables that passed near St. Pierre
and Miquelon. Finally, the Canadian government became alarmed over the issue of
the fisheries. There was great concern over the fact that local fishery products could
be sent to Germany through France and, therefore, contribute to the enemy’s war
effort.6 Thus it quickly became clear to Canadian officials that the French islands were
now part of the larger struggle for the North Atlantic.
The government of Newfoundland was the first to suggest an immediate invasion
of St. Pierre and Miquelon. As early as 19 June 1940, Newfoundland authorities asked
London for permission to take over and administer the French islands. As a British
colony, Newfoundland had to obtain British approval and military support before
undertaking such an action. The thinking behind this bold proposal was both strategic
and economic.  St. John’s saw in the fall of France an opportunity to eliminate, once
and for all, the historic rivalry that existed between Newfoundland and St. Pierre and
Miquelon over Grand Banks fisheries. An annexation of the French colony, it was
believed, could assure the dominance of the Newfoundland fishing industry in the
region. It could also prevent Canada and the United States from being tempted to
occupy the islands for the duration of the war and to transfer to themselves the cause
of constant irritation that Newfoundland had historically endured because of their
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possession by France. For these reasons, Newfoundland wanted to act first.7
London declined Newfoundland’s proposal for immediate action. Instead, the
British recommended that Newfoundland should work out with Canada what forces
might be needed to occupy the islands should the need ever arise. Upon receipt of
these instructions, L. Edward Emerson, Newfoundland’s Commissioner for Justice
and Defence, went to Ottawa to discuss the issue with Canadian officials and assert
his government’s claim to primacy. On 27 June 1940, Emerson told O.D. Skelton,
Canada’s Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, that “the collapse of the
French government makes it necessary for the governments of Canada and
Newfoundland to consider the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon as a possible source
of danger to the Allied cause” and that “we must therefore be prepared for the
possibility of taking over the general administration of the islands”. Emerson further
warned that “it must also be borne in mind that the islands may not willingly submit
to any treatment no matter how diplomatically it is suggested and that a force for
occupation may have to be provided”. Emerson wanted Canada to back up
Newfoundland’s initiative with such financial and military assistance as was required;
in other words, Canada would invade the islands and Newfoundland would govern
them.8
Despite Newfoundland’s request, Canada’s War Cabinet refused to prepare such
an action for fear of offending the American State Department, which, it was believed,
might interpret such an act as a violation of the Monroe Doctrine.9 The Canadian
government did not want a repetition of the problems encountered in early April 1940
when Washington vigorously opposed Ottawa’s intention to send a military
expedition (Force “X”) to occupy Greenland in the immediate aftermath of
Germany’s invasion of Denmark. Canada wanted to take over the Danish colony to
prevent it from falling into German hands and to protect the cryolite mines at Ivigtut,
which were essential for Canadian aluminum production. The United States, on the
other hand, was extremely anxious that “no action of this kind be taken by Canada
since it might offer an excuse to other large countries for taking over colonial
territories of occupied European countries”. At the time, the Americans were
particularly concerned with Japanese aggression and expansionism. They maintained
that such an action might incite Japan to invade European or even American
possessions in Asia and the Pacific.10 Preparing an occupation of St. Pierre and
Miquelon, Ottawa believed, would likely trigger another jurisdictional incident with
the United States. Besides, as Commander F.L. Houghton, Director of Plans Division,
explained in a memorandum: “These islands would be of little use to Canada or the
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enemy; better submarine or surface craft bases existed on the south coast of
Newfoundland and could easily be occupied by the enemy”. The Canadian
government’s decision not to intervene, however, was not unanimous. On 29 June, for
instance, C.G. Power, Canada’s Minister of National Defence for Air, told Jay
Pierrepont Moffat, American Minister to Canada, that “if he had his way, Canadian
troops would occupy it [St. Pierre and Miquelon]”.11
Between 29 June and 1 July, Raymond Gushue of the Newfoundland Fisheries
Board went to St. Pierre and Miquelon to investigate the situation. Gushue found the
islanders despondent over the stunning defeat of France and expecting a takeover by
some neighboring government. Their preference in this regard was to become part of
the United States, an outcome which many believed would benefit the islands more
than association with Canada and Newfoundland. In his report, Gushue sided with the
British and Canadians and argued against Newfoundland’s scheme to seize the
islands. Such action, he emphasized, would be unwise in view of the legacy of
bitterness, which remained from the decades of rivalry between the British and the
French colony. According to him, the citizens of St. Pierre and Miquelon “would
rather fight than be associated with Newfoundland”.12
Tensions rose on 3 July 1940 when a British naval squadron attacked an important
part of the French fleet anchored in the port of Mers-el-Kébir near Oran in Algeria.
This action was done to prevent the French vessels, which included the modern
battleships Dunkerque and Strasbourg, from falling into German hands. The French
suffered more than 1,500 casualties. Vichy France’s response was immediate: French
aircraft bombed the British in Gibraltar, French warships were instructed to intercept
British merchantmen and fire upon them at the least provocation and orders were
given not to allow British ships within twenty miles of French coasts.13
As a state of undeclared war developed between Great Britain and Vichy France,
the governments of Canada and Newfoundland became alarmed with the situation of
St. Pierre and Miquelon. The Newfoundland authorities reacted immediately by
banning all ships from sailing to the French islands. The presence in the French
colony of the armed sloop Ville d’Ys contributed to such a decision. On 4 July 1940,
Sir Humphrey Walwyn, Governor of Newfoundland, wrote O.D. Skelton that, “in
view of latest information . . . we feel increased apprehension as to the position of St.
Pierre and would like to suggest that suitable naval and military action should be taken
to prevent the islands or French vessels there from hostile action against us or British
shipping”. That same day, Canadian Rear Admiral Percy W. Nelles, Chief of the
Naval Staff, suggested that “in view of the action which is being taken against the
French Navy in various parts of the world”, the British cruiser H.M.S. Caradoc or one
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Canadian destroyer attack the Ville d’Ys in its harbor at St. Pierre.14
The United States took the deteriorating situation with Vichy France very
seriously. On 5 July 1940, Moffat met with Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie
King and expressed the American government’s desire that Canada undertake no
unilateral military occupation of St. Pierre and Miquelon or other non-British
European dependencies in the Americas. Washington was well aware that London
was putting increasing pressure on Ottawa to be responsible for the protection of
British possessions in the Western Hemisphere. Canadian troops were already
garrisoning Bermuda (Force “B”), Jamaica (Force “Y”) and Newfoundland (Force
“W”), and were helping the British defend Iceland (Force “Z”). Within the next
months, Canadian military detachments would also be deployed to Labrador (Force
“G”), the Bahamas (Force “N”) and British Guiana. There would even be plans to
send garrisons to the Falkland Islands (Force “F”) and to British Honduras. The
Americans in general had no problem with this arrangement as long as Canada
protected only British possessions, although they were concerned with Great Britain’s
desire to have Canada send a garrision to protect the important oil refineries located
on the Dutch West Indian island of Aruba off Venezuela, which had been occupied
by a Franco-British contingent since the fall of the Netherlands in May 1940.
Occupying the overseas territories of other European countries without their
approbation, as would be the case with an invasion of St. Pierre and Miquelon, was
deemed unacceptable in Washington.15 In the end, Mackenzie King refused to
authorize a Canadian takeover of St. Pierre and Miquelon and agreed to consult with
the United States before taking any military action in the western hempisphere.16
Instead, the Canadian government resorted to diplomacy and attempted to
negotiate with Governor de Bournat and the French authorities in St. Pierre and
Miquelon. A joint delegation composed of J. Hubert Penson, Newfoundland’s
Commissioner of Finance, and Commander J.W. Rouër Roy of the Royal Canadian
Navy visited St. Pierre from 17 to 20 July. The aim of the mission was to obtain a
guarantee that the islands would not be available for enemy use and to discuss the role
of the Ville d’Ys and de Bournat’s relationship with the Vichy government. The
outcome was most promising. The St. Pierre and Miquelon authorities agreed that the
islands would not be used for any purpose by the enemy and guaranteed that they
would advise Canada of any enemy activity in the area. But the French authorities
refused to accept Commander Roy’s suggestion that the Ville d’Ys join the Royal
Canadian Navy or be interned in a Canadian or American port. They did, however,
guaranteed that the French warship would not be employed in any manner hostile to
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British or Canadian interests.17
The Canadian government was satisfied with the mission. The St. Pierre and
Miquelon authorities had responded to almost all of the Canadian concerns and
Ottawa perceived this as a sign of friendship. The French colony no longer seemed to
be a threat, at least for the moment. Contributing to this change of attitude was a
hemisphere defence agreement reached by the United States and twenty Latin
American republics at the Organization of American States conference in Havana on
27 July 1940. Taking into account the imperative need for continental security, these
countries agreed to an inter-American provisional administration of European
possessions in the Western Hemisphere that were threatened with transfer from one
non-American state to another. The details of this arrangement were listed in the so-
called Act of Havana which stated that one or more American countries, subject to the
overriding control of an Inter-American Committee for Territorial Administration
composed of representatives of each of the twenty-one American republics, could
intervene in European colonies whenever necessary to prevent changes in
sovereignty.18
Although Canada was not invited to the Havana Conference, the Canadian
government welcomed the inter-American trusteeship plan, for it discouraged Nazi
Germany from gaining control of European territories in the Western Hemisphere.
The conference both relieved Canada of the need to garrison non-British European
possessions such as Aruba and helped to install a sense of continental security in
Ottawa. It also made a unilateral invasion of St. Pierre and Miquelon by Canada even
less feasible. On 1 August 1940, Loring Christie, Canadian Minister to the United
States, gave American Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles assurance that, in
spite of the Act of Havana, “the Canadian government had announced it had no
intention of interfering either with the administration or status of the islands”. Christie
added, however, that “if any danger should arise as regards St. Pierre and Miquelon
particularly, the Canadian government have assumed that this would be a matter of
immediate interest to the United States and in that event would be glad to consider any
means by which Canada could cooperate in any necessary defensive provision”.19
Another reason that persuaded Ottawa to take no action against St. Pierre and
Miquelon was the Ogdensburg Agreement. The fall of France and the mounting
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German threat to Great Britain forced the Canadian government to reconsider
Canada’s own defences in the summer of 1940. The obvious solution was to look to
the United States for help. On 17 and 18 August 1940, Mackenzie King met with
American President Franklin D. Roosevelt at Ogdensburg, New York, to nail down a
continental defence pact. The two leaders agreed to establish a Permanent Joint Board
on Defence, which would be responsible for coordinating joint defence planning
between the two countries. This new accord bound Canada and the United States in
matters of defence cooperation. Government officials in Ottawa feared that a
unilateral Canadian military occupation of St. Pierre and Miquelon might jeopardize
the new agreement.20
The Canadian government was also less inclined to intervene in the affairs of St.
Pierre and Miquelon for fear of offending French Canadians. The conservative, pro-
Catholic Vichy regime, and its support of Travail, Famille, Patrie, appealed to
numerous conservative French Canadians. For many, Vichy represented the
legitimate government of France. Mackenzie King was particularly worried that
French Canadians might interpret an invasion of St. Pierre and Miquelon as “evidence
of Anglo-Saxon arrogance and lack of sympathy with Vichy”. This, he believed,
could cause serious political controversy in Canada.21
Still, Canada’s Joint Planning Committee of the Armed Services secretly studied
the possibility of invading St. Pierre and Miquelon. The Committee had been working
on such a scheme since 6 July 1940. Its conclusions were integrated into a 1 August
1940 secret report which stipulated that:
If it is the intention of the Canadian government to take over the
administration of these islands, the Committee are of the opinion that the
following action will be necessary: Take over the French sloop [Ville d’Ys]
by the use of a superior naval force, order her into Halifax or other British
port in order to prevent her carrying out any hostile action against us or from
falling into the hands of the enemy. The Committee further recommends that
this operation should be assisted by a flight of bomber reconnaissance
aircraft. . . . If it is found that it will be necessary to station troops in the
islands from the point of view of internal security the Committee considers
that the maximum number of troops which might be employed would not
exceed one company of infantry.22
Clearly, the presence of the Ville d’Ys in the French colony was regarded as a
problem in Canadian military circles. The issue was solved on 9 September 1940
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when the islands’ authorities decided to send the warship to Fort-de-France
(Martinique) where the French Western Atlantic naval squadron of Admiral Georges
Robert, Vichy High Commissioner for the French territories in the Western
Hemisphere and commander in chief of the French Western Atlantic naval force, was
located. This decision, however, was delayed until early November due to serious
political unrest in St. Pierre and Miquelon.23
The fact was that a large proportion of the local population supported the Allies
and the Free French movement of General de Gaulle. According to the British Vice-
Consul in St. Pierre and Miquelon, crowds would often demonstrate on the piers
against the presence of the Vichy warship in the colony. The situation reached its
climax on 15 September when a group of demonstrators reacted violently to the action
taken by the crew of the Ville d’Ys, who had apparently prepared an anti-aircraft gun
for action with the apparent intention of firing at the two Royal Canadian Air Force
B-18 Digby reconnaissance-bombers which had been flying low over the islands. The
small riot was quelled when the officers of the Ville d’Ys turned fire hoses and
searchlights on the demonstrators and set up a cordon of armed seamen around the
pier, but the situation demonstrated the existence of pro-de Gaulle sentiments on the
islands. As a result, the British government began to consider that it might be
desirable to have General de Gaulle proceed with arrangements for his supporters to
take over the administration of St. Pierre and Miquelon in a coup d’état.24 The
Canadian government felt somewhat differently. According to O.D. Skelton: “It is not
considered that action such as has been suggested . . . is, under present circumstances,
either necessary or advisable.”25
At the same time, the British government was becoming increasingly concerned
with the disposition of France’s Grand Bank fishing fleet which was seeking shelter
and safety in the port of St. Pierre. Some thirty vessels in all had taken refuge,
including twelve modern trawlers. The British were determined to prevent their return
to France with their cargoes of fish, which amounted to about 20,000 tons. This, it was
believed, was enough to meet half of France’s annual domestic requirements of fish
products and could, therefore, constitute a substantial contribution to the enemy war
effort if marketed in Germany. But when the British suggested on 18 October that the
Royal Canadian Navy seize and detain twelve French off-shore fishing trawlers based
at St. Pierre, Skelton responded that he “did not understand the ground on which we
would be warranted in taking feasible action to seize these vessels”. He added: “We
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are not at war with France and do not wish to create an incident that would allow
others to put on our shoulders the responsibility of the outcome. There were people in
London who would not hesitate to have us take the blame for the policy they were
themselves devising”.26
Evidently, Ottawa was irritated at the British for proposing actions that threatened
to undermine Canada’s achievement in securing de Bournat’s de facto neutrality.
Before the British could decide how to respond to the Canadian decision, many of the
fishing trawlers began leaving St. Pierre and Miquelon for Vichy-controlled ports.
Much to the British admiralty’s annoyance, only two were intercepted by the Royal
Navy. Most of the other trawlers managed to reach France, where they fell into
German hands.27 The situation clearly demonstrated how Canada wished to
promulgate an image of non-intervention in regards to St. Pierre and Miquelon. The
incident reminded Canadian statesmen of the Émile Bertin affair of late June 1940,
when London instructed Ottawa to take “any action however strong” to prevent the
French cruiser Émile Bertin, which carried an estimated $300 millions in gold
belonging to the Bank of France, from leaving Halifax. Fearful of “how the
Americans would feel in seeing Canada firing on a French ship” and how French
Canada would react to such an act, the Canadian government refused the British
request; in the end, the French warship left Canada unscratched and sailed for
Martinique.28
When Marshal Henri-Phillippe Pétain met with Adolf Hitler at Montoire on 24
October 1940 to discuss collaboration between Vichy France and Nazi Germany, the
Allies grew more worried. They feared that France might help Germany militarily.
Precautions had to be taken in regards to all French possessions, including St. Pierre
and Miquelon.29 As historian C.P. Stacey wrote in 1940:
Canada has no reason to wish to possess Saint-Pierre and Miquelon herself,
but she has every reason to wish to prevent them from becoming bases for a
possible aggressor. . . . Concern for her own security will oblige her to keep
a vigilant eye upon Saint-Pierre and Miquelon.30
On 28 October 1940, Skelton requested Mackenzie King “to consider what action
should be taken regarding St. Pierre and Miquelon in the event of a rupture [with
Vichy France]”. Mackenzie King replied that discussion should immediately be
undertaken with the United States as to the “general lines of the action to be taken in
the event of the Government of France adopting an actively hostile policy”.31
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Consequently, Loring Christie met with Sumner Welles in Washington on 1
November 1940 to discuss a hypothetical invasion of St. Pierre and Miquelon. During
their conversation, Welles mentioned that in principle he recognized “Canada’s
special concern regarding these islands” and also “that it would be desirable to arrive
at a joint policy between Canada and the United States”. He also thought that utilizing
the Permanent Joint Board on Defence at some stage in the proceedings might turn out
to be an excellent one. Welles added that “if the United States were to agree to an
occupation of the islands by Canada and were subsequently charged with consenting
to a violation of the Act of Havana, it could reasonably contend that the Act did not
apply to the action taken by Canada since Canada is an American nation”. As he
explained: “The proper interpretation of the Act is that it applies only to transfers from
a European state to a non-American state, and that it therefore does not apply to a
transfer of sovereignty over St. Pierre and Miquelon to Canada, much less to a
temporary occupation of the islands by Canada”.32 In the end, no action was
undertaken against the French colony as it became clear that the Vichy regime was not
yet ready to provide military assistance to the Germans. Consequently, the issue of St.
Pierre and Miquelon ceased to attract the attention of the Allied powers.
In the spring of 1941, however, St. Pierre and Miquelon returned as an issue in
Canadian war planning as a result of two developments. One was the intensification
of the Battle of the Atlantic and the other the concessions made by the Vichy
government to the Germans throughout French Africa and the Middle East. Early in
1941, German surface raiders began operating in the Northwestern Atlantic. Between
January and March, for example, the battle cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau
attacked convoys off the Grand Banks of Newfoundland. The arrival of the battleship
Bismarck in the Western Atlantic in late May caused even greater concern in Allied
naval circles. Adding to the problem was the increasing presence of German
submarines in the region, which resulted in a dramatic rise of shipping losses. An
immediate result of this was the establishment of the Newfoundland Escort Force in
early May 1941 to provide greater anti-submarine protection for convoys. Based in St.
John’s, the warships assigned to this naval force operated under Canadian command
and eventually came to include Free French vessels.33
While this occurred, Vichy France began collaborating militarily with Germany.
Between April and May, for instance, the Vichy authorities allowed German troops
into Syria and other French possessions, agreed to supply military equipment to
General Erwin Rommel’s Afrika Korps in North Africa and permitted German
submarines operating in the South Atlantic limited access to the port of Dakar in
French West Africa. The long-standing fears of Vichy collaboration with Nazi
Germany had now become reality. In light of these developments, Canadian officials
became increasingly worried over the possibility that St. Pierre and Miquelon might
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provide enemy naval forces with information and assistance.34
The rising tensions with Vichy France began to worry the Canadian government,
which decided on 16 May 1941 that a Royal Canadian Mounted Police [RCMP]
inspector should be sent to St. Pierre and Miquelon to investigate the political
situation there. News of this decision agitated the American State Department, which
had been misled to believe, through American newspapers, that Canada was planning
to take over the islands.35 Although Norman A. Robertson, Canada’s new Under-
Secretary of State for External Affairs, clarified the situation in Washington, the
government of Newfoundland remained skeptical of Canadian intentions.
Anticipating an eventual Canadian military takeover of St. Pierre and Miquelon,
Newfoundland began to promulgate the notion that the French islands were under its
sphere of influence.36 On 21 May 1941, the Governor of Newfoundland explained to
Robertson that:
Geographically they [St. Pierre and Miquelon] are as much a part of this
country [Newfoundland] as any other islands that surround our coast, and in
this respect bear the same relation to Newfoundland as [the] Magdelan islands
and Anticosti do to Canada. . . . In fact there is so little to justify control
passing from Vichy to any government but that of Newfoundland. . . . 
Under all these circumstances we urge: (1) that before the matter of defence
of St. Pierre and Miquelon are settled, this government be consulted; (2) that
the Canadian government use its best endeavors to ensure that if civil control
of the islands is to pass from Vichy hands, that it be entrusted to the
Newfoundland government.37
In another report, the Government of Newfoundland objected to any temporary
occupation of the islands by Canada or the United States “unless it is given civil
control of the islands and the occupation by Canada and the United States is purely
military”. In other words, Newfoundland wanted Canada or the United States to
invade St. Pierre and Miquelon as long as the two powers agreed to give St. John’s
political control of the islands’ administration. Ottawa agreed that “when political,
economic, defence or other requirements make intervention necessary”, it would
discuss the situation with the Government of Newfoundland.38
In the meantime, RCMP Inspector Oscar LaRivière was sent to St. Pierre and
Miquelon on 21 May with the ostensible object of investigating, for the Canadian
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Customs and Preventive Service, the smuggling of alcohol into Prince Edward Island,
which was still under Prohibition. His real mission, however, was “to attempt to
discover the general attitude of the administrator and the people of St. Pierre and to
report on all other points of interests, such as . . . signs of enemy activity”.39 While
LaRivière “spied” in St. Pierre and Miquelon, the Canadian Joint Planning Committee
issued a memorandum on 22 May 1941 urging the creation of military plans for the
occupation of the islands. As the document stipulated, the object of the occupation
would be to prevent the use of these islands by the enemy as a refueling, repair and rest
base for submarines and aircraft, and as a center for the collection and transmission of
enemy intelligence. The Joint Planning Committee recommended that the Joint Service
Committee of the Atlantic Coast “be put in possession of all the information at our
disposal and be ordered to prepare definite and detailed operational orders for the
occupation of St. Pierre and Miquelon”. It suggested that the landing force should
consist of one company of infantry furnished by the Sherbrooke Fusiliers Regiment
which would be transported in two corvettes from Sydney, Nova Scotia. The Joint
Planning Committee also recommended that air reconnaissance before and during the
landing be emphasized.40 In order that no misunderstandings emerged as a result of an
eventual Canadian occupation of the French islands, Major General H.D.G. Crerar,
Chief of the General Staff, clarified on 24 May 1941 that “while this would be carried
out by military forces, it should not be looked at as a capture or annexation of the
islands but rather their temporary occupation for the duration of the war”.41
Canadian military authorities began to prepare a secret strategic plan for the
invasion of the islands on 28 May 1941.42 The plan was issued by the Joint Service
Committee of the Atlantic and submitted to the Chiefs of Staff Committee on 11 June.
Referred to as the Plan for Operation “Q”, it envisaged the landing of a small
Canadian military force on the islands with aerial and naval assistance. It was to be a
combined operation. The landing party was to consist of one company of infantry
equipped with motorcycles and bicycles. Engineer, Signals, Medical and Army
Service Corps personnel were also to be attached to the mission. The landing party
was to be supported by a naval force of two corvettes and one destroyer and an aerial
contingent of one bomber-reconnaissance squadron of five aircraft. The expeditionary
force was to assemble in Sydney, Nova Scotia and proceed to the coastal town of St.
Pierre. Aware that the islands possessed no adequate defenses other than one four-
inch gun and one armed vessel, and no organized or semi-organized military force
other than the local Gendarmerie and a number of demobilized French soldiers,
Canadian military planners felt that the occupation of St. Pierre and Miquelon could
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be done with minimal force. In view of the circumstances, it was agreed that no naval
or aerial bombardment would be required and that there was no necessity to
complicate navigation by attempting to land under cover of darkness or use special
landing crafts. However, because the Canadians were unaware of how the local
population would react to a Canadian takeover, it was “considered advisable to look
upon the operation as one made in an enemy territory with a possibility of hostile
attitude by a proportion of the population”.43
The first step of the plan was to take over the town of St. Pierre in order to
neutralize the colony’s administration. The principal landing places were to be the
docks in the inner harbor and small beaches on the northeast side of the town. The
troops were to seize the wireless transmitter station; take possession of the
administrative offices, government house, police station, custom house and post
office; and occupy the cable relay station, the local power plant, the telephone
exchange and, finally, the cable landing. Measures were also to be undertaken against
the four-inch coastal gun if it was found to be manned. The emphasis was that “these
should be occupied with speed and in a definite manner with a view to paralyzing any
possible resistance”. In the meantime, the Royal Canadian Navy was to neutralize the
armed vessel and occupy the harbor’s coal wharf while air reconnaissance sorties
were conducted by the Royal Canadian Air Force. Once the “vulnerable points” had
been secured, the landing party was to consolidate its occupation of the entire island
of St. Pierre; civilian cypher personnel were to handle the island’s administration.
With St. Pierre secured, Canadian troops were then to occupy the rest of the
archipelago. In order to overcome the possibility of popular resistance and sabotage,
the Canadian troops were to be self-contained in terms of food and ammunition. With
this in mind, supplies were to consist of a “30 day reserve with 7 day partially fresh”.44
A few days after this plan was submitted, RCMP Inspector LaRivière returned to
Halifax and issued his report on the political situation in the islands. He believed that,
although the French authorities were doing everything possible to discourage people
from sympathizing with the Allied cause, close to 90 per cent of the local population
were strong supporters. LaRivière’s conclusion was that “the inhabitants of St. Pierre
and Miquelon . . . would . . . have no objection to Canada or the United States taking
over the islands for the duration of the war”. LaRivière’s report reinforced several
letters received from St. Pierre and Miquelon residents urging Canadian intervention
and promising popular support.45 This situation gave Ottawa the sense that a Canadian
expeditionary force would be welcomed in the islands and face no resistance
whatsoever.
With this in mind, the Chiefs of Staff Committee approved the plan for the
occupation of St. Pierre and Miquelon on 28 June 1941. Influenced by the level of
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pro-Allied sympathy in the islands, however, the Committee made a few minor
adjustments. Because it considered that the use of a destroyer was uneconomical for
such an operation, the Committee suggested that only two corvettes and one small
merchant ship be employed for the purpose. It also requested that an RCMP
detachment accompany the force to aid in civil administration, that the capacity of the
bomber-reconnaissance squadron be dropped from five aircraft to three and that it
should be borne in mind that it may be necessary to put this plan into operation at very
short notice. In the end, Operation “Q” remained a closely guarded secret.46
In the meantime, British and Canadian intelligence personnel became increasingly
worried about the possibility that enemy activity might be taking place on the islands
of St. Pierre and Miquelon. Reports suggested that the islands’ oil fuel capacity had
been increased to a level much in excess of that normally used in the colony.
Reinforcing these suspicions was the fact that the St. Pierre and Miquelon authorities
often closed “a certain strip of coast . . . to the public either permanently or at night
and during fogs”. According to a former St. Pierre and Miquelon resident, this had
occurred more than ten times. The natural conclusion was that submarine refueling
was taking place.47 RCMP Commissioner S.T. Wood added fuel to the fire on 4
August 1941 when he declared that he was almost certain that espionage was taking
place on the islands. As he stated:
The immediate danger lies in the opportunities which the residents of the
islands have for engaging in espionage and sabotage and I have reason to
believe that there have been activities along these lines in regard to the
movement of our convoys and shipping. . . . Evidence has proven certain
facts in regard to the operation of the wireless stations at St. Pierre et
Miquelon. The dispatch of code cablegrams and telegrams, communications
with vessels at sea and their remarkable knowledge of nautical problems
make it obvious that certain residents of St. Pierre et Miquelon are fully
qualified to carry on espionage and sabotage along such lines.48
“We should not wait”, Wood concluded “until something disastrous happens, to take
over the control of the islands. . . . In the interests of our North Atlantic fleet and our
armed forces, no time should be lost in taking over the control of the islands”.49
With mounting evidence of Vichy France collaborating with Nazi Germany, the
War Cabinet met on 13 August 1941 to consider its stand and agreed to immediately
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open a consulate at St. Pierre. The belief was that a Canadian presence on the islands
would help monitor more closely the attitudes of the local population as well as enemy
activities. There were, however, delays in the appointment of the Consul due to the
Department of External Affairs’ “inability to find a really suitable man for a dull and
difficult post”. Despite the circumstances, most politicians still favored a diplomatic
approach rather than a military one. Norman A. Robertson, for example, remarked “I
would be opposed to allowing . . . our own forces to occupy the islands. I do not think
there would be any difficulty about the operation or any risk of casualties, but I would
be very much afraid that an initiative of this sort prove a pretext for renewed . . .
collaboration [on the part of Vichy]”.50 While the Canadian government decided in
favor of a diplomatic approach, the Canadian military continued to prepare Operation
“Q”. As Captain E.S. Brand, Director of Naval Intelligence, indicated on 12 August
1941: “Effective control of all communications and administration is the only
guarantee that St. Pierre will not prove a danger to our security, and nothing less than
strong official action will remove this danger”.51
The small expeditionary force (Force “Q”) which was to take part in the
intervention against St. Pierre and Miquelon was officially formed at Camp Debert,
Nova Scotia, on 15 August under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert Cook
and Major Miller Marshall. It consisted of “C” company of the Lake Superior
Regiment, a number of ancillary troops and six members of the RCMP, for a grand
total of 194 men. To conceal the operation, rumours stipulating that Force “Q” was
intended to defend Sydney in the event of a sudden German landing were deliberately
circulated in order to mislead the curious and the suspicious. The real mission was
repeatedly tested in the Nova Scotia countryside. According to the plan, the operation
against St. Pierre and Miquelon could be initiated on six hours notice. None of the
hundreds of Canadian soldiers already stationed in Newfoundland since the summer
of 1940 were to be used for the invasion. The general belief was that using the colony
of Newfoundland in any way would only complicate matters by getting Great Britain
involved.52
On 21 August 1941, the Chiefs of Staff Committee attempted to launch Operation
“Q”, recommending an early occupation of the islands for the following reasons: 
(A) The route of convoys lie within 100 miles of St. Pierre and Miquelon
thus enabling easy observation of movements of convoys on the part of
fishermen of the islands. Their observations can be reported to shore either
by wireless from the vessels at sea (actual messages having been intercepted)
or by the vessels periodically returning to port to make reports; (B) The
wireless station at St. Pierre is in communication with Canada, the United
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States, Martinique, Europe, Africa and Asia. Frequent communication is
carried on with France; (C) The islands lie close to two important bases – the
United States base at Argentia and the base at St. John’s Newfoundland; (D)
Transatlantic cables are situated close to St. Pierre and it is possible for such
cables to be cut by the fishing trawlers. This has occurred off the coast of the
British Isles and Australia. It is also possible that cables could be tapped; (E)
It is possible that a hostile submarine or other vessel could be provisioned
and fueled at St. Pierre if it were able to slip past our naval patrols; (F) There
is evidence of a pro-Vichy attitude on the part of the St. Pierre and Miquelon
authorities.53
Although approved at a meeting of the Defence Council, the Chiefs of Staff
Committee’s request was rejected by the War Cabinet on 30 August 1941 on the
ground that “no action was needed at the moment”. This had to do with the recent
appointment of Christopher Eberts as Canadian Consul at St. Pierre. Despite this new
development, Force “Q” remained active, but was advised on 17 September 1941 that
it no longer needed to be mobilized within six hours notice. Instead, it was kept on a
72 hours call.54 Clearly, Canada preferred diplomacy over military action.
By October 1941 there was increased awareness that cypher communications to
and from the islands constituted a source of danger for Allied naval services. This
coincided with the fact that the submarine war in the North Atlantic was increasingly
being fought closer to Canadian home waters. In fact, Canadian naval authorities
estimated that at least thirty German submarines were operating in the Northwest
Atlantic, four of them near the northern entrance of the Strait of Belle Isle.55 As such,
there was the threat that the St. Pierre and Miquelon radio transmitter might be used
to communicate vital information to German submarine commanders. After all, a
letter had been intercepted by Canadian Naval Intelligence which indicated, according
to a St. Pierre resident, that the authorities in the French colony had been purchasing
a great deal of equipment suitable for the manufacture of radio transmitters and
receivers. Causing great concern was the fact that this Frenchman, after having been
abruptly ordered out of a room in a building where there appeared to be a great deal
of wireless equipment being installed, had been told by a friend that “the Canadians
know we are making an extension to the wireless installation, but they have no idea
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that it is anything like as extensive as what we are doing”.56
Worried that the St. Pierre and Miquelon wireless station could be used to
compromise Canadian defences, the Canadian government began contemplating the
idea of sending Canadian personnel to the islands to exercise supervision and control
“all outward messages from this station and to prevent the use of cypher or of any
code which we are not able to read”.57 On 29 October, the War Cabinet approved this
proposal and agreed that four civilian wireless operators be sent from Canada to St.
Pierre on board a corvette or minesweeper supplied by the Royal Canadian Navy. The
Canadian representatives were to arrive in the islands on 11 December and call on the
local administrator to cooperate. Should the latter refuse and threaten to expel them,
the representatives were given the authority to “report to the officer in charge of the
corvette, who will thereupon put a landing party ashore, which will effectively
dismantle all radio transmitters on the islands”. The scenario required stationing a
control party on the islands despite the local governor’s protests.58 In other words, the
Canadians agreed to present Governor de Bournat with an ultimatum and to occupy
the islands if it was rejected. In the end, because it was feared that such an action
“might be interpreted by Vichy as an effort by Canada to take control if not possession
of the islands” and that “Vichy might seek to find in the incident an excuse to turn
over the French fleet to Germany as a means of protecting French colonial
possessions”, it was agreed that any action on Canada’s part should be delayed until
“we had ascertained the views of the governments of Great Britain and the United
States”.59
Because the Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defence had
unanimously agreed on 10 November that the existence on the islands of an
uncontrolled and high-powered wireless transmitting station constituted a potential
danger to the interests of Canada and the United States, Ottawa felt confident that
Washington would support all aspects of the Canadian proposition. It was wrong.
Although the United States accepted the idea of Canada sending civilian technicians
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to the islands to monitor the operation of the radio station, Washington vigorously
opposed any forceful attempt to take control of it.60 Great Britain, on the other hand,
preferred to have a Free French naval force rally St. Pierre and Miquelon. London
feared that any Canadian action might lead to a possible charge of British imperialism.
A Free French action seemed most satisfactory since it would involve no change of
sovereignty. But for the Canadians, “this step appeared . . . to be inappropriate”. The
feeling was that any brusque change in the status of the islands might create
misunderstandings in Canada, anger the American government, generate more tension
with Vichy France and, as a consequence, alter the position of other French colonies
in the Western Hemisphere. Faced with conflicting advice from the Americans and
the British, Mackenzie King decided to postpone indefinitely the projected action.61
New developments in the conduct of the war overseas reinforced Mackenzie
King’s decision not to intervene in the affairs of St. Pierre and Miquelon. On the early
morning of 7 December 1941, Imperial Japan attacked parts of the United States
Pacific fleet anchored at Pearl Harbor in the Hawaiian Islands and launched an
important military offensive against American, British and Dutch possessions in
Southeast Asia and the Southern Pacific. Among the defenders of the British
possession of Hong Kong were two Canadian battalions of infantry (Force “C”): the
Royal Rifles of Canada and the Winnipeg Grenadiers. The sudden Japanese offensive
in the Far East and the fact that Canadian troops were now under enemy fire at Hong
Kong caught Mackenzie King and the Canadian government by surprise. The War
Cabinet met early that evening and the next day Canada declared war on Japan along
with Great Britain and the United States. Canada was now at war against a first-class
power capable of menacing its western coastline. The St. Pierre and Miquelon threat
suddenly seemed less worrisome to Ottawa.62
Nevertheless, fearing a possible Canadian takeover, General de Gaulle ordered
Admiral Émile Henri Muselier, Commander in Chief of the Free French Naval
Forces, to secretly prepare the Free French warships assigned to the Newfoundland
Escort Force for an eventual invasion of the islands. Clearly, de Gaulle did not
appreciate the fact that foreign powers had been planning an occupation of French
territory without consulting him. Foreign holdings were a pre-occupation of the Free
French authorities, as they provided bases of operation, material resources, manpower
and money to the movement. But, most importantly, they gave political legitimacy to
the Free French cause. Thus de Gaulle was determined to protect French sovereignty
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against foreign interests and to maintain the French Empire intact.63 Although de
Gaulle requested that the planned operation be kept secret, Muselier deemed it
necessary to discuss the issue with Allied representatives. On 15 December 1941
Muselier visited Ottawa from Halifax, where he had arrived with some Free French
naval vessels detached from the Newfoundland Escort Force. In discussions with
American, British and Canadian officials, he recommended an immediate Free French
occupation of the islands, arguing that such an operation would be bloodless and
would remove the threat of the wireless station.64
The Americans stated quite emphatically that they were against a Free French
intervention. At the time, American Rear Admiral Frederick J. Horne and Vichy
French Admiral Georges Robert were in the midst of negotiating the renewal of the
Robert-Greenslade Agreement of October-November 1940, which guaranteed the
non-belligerency of the French West Indies naval squadron and the maintenance of
the status quo with respect to Vichy possessions in the Western Hemisphere in
exchange for American economic assistance to the French Caribbean. Washington
made it clear that it would not “interfere with the status of French possessions in this
hemisphere so long as the Germans do not secure the French fleet or have access to
French territory for military operations against the Allies”.65 The feeling was that a
Free French invasion could jeopardize the negotiations taking place and upset the
delicate balance of relations with Vichy. To counter such a danger, the American State
Department proposed that Canadian radio personnel establish effective supervision of
the wireless station in St. Pierre and Miquelon as long as French sovereignty be
respected. The United States felt that a “limited Canadian operation confined to
supervision of wireless transmissions would have fewer political repercussions than
occupation of islands by Free French”. The Robert-Horne agreement was finally
signed on 17 December.66
The British, on the other hand, saw a Free French occupation as most appropriate
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since they felt that “the installation of Canadian radio personnel was unlikely to prove
a lasting solution”. As for the Canadian government, although it believed that “any
action taken should be by Canada”, it decided not to act and suggested that the United
States and Great Britain agree on a solution. Canada would cooperate in the execution
of any agreement reached by both powers. Giving into American objections, Muselier
agreed not to go through with the mission.67
This “promise” was not upheld. Fearing that the Canadians might try to take
control of the transmitting station in St. Pierre and Miquelon, de Gaulle ordered
Muselier on 17 December to rally the islands as soon as possible. As he indicated:
“Nous savons, de source certaine, que les canadiens ont l’intention de faire eux-
mêmes la destruction du poste radio de St. Pierre. Dans ces conditions, je vous
prescris de procéder au ralliement de St. Pierre et Miquelon par vos propres moyens
et sans rien dire aux étrangers. Je prends l’entière responsabilité de cette opération,
devenue indispensable pour conserver à la France ces possessions française”.68 On 22
December 1941, Commander in Chief Muselier of the Free French Naval Forces
returned to Halifax from Ottawa and ordered the crews of the corvettes Aconit, Alysse
and Mimosa, as well as the submarine Surcouf, to prepare to set sail. The division left
the Canadian port on 23 December with the ostensible object of sailing back to St.
John’s, where they were to rejoin the Newfoundland Escort Force. However, in the
midst of their journey, the Free French warships changed course and appeared off the
coast of St. Pierre and Miquelon on the early morning of 24 December. The four
vessels then proceeded to the port of St. Pierre, where armed sailors disembarked and
took possession of all communication and government buildings. The entire operation
was completed in a matter of 20 minutes without firing a single shot.69 Governor de
Bournat was immediately arrested and replaced by Muselier’s aide-de-camp Captain
Alain Savary. The Free French sailors told the local population “que si les Français
Libres ont débarqué, c’est pour empêcher les Américains, les Canadiens et même les
Allemands d’occuper l’île et de les en chasser”. On 25 December, a plebiscite was
held on the islands, in which males of 18 years and over were given choice between
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“rallying to Free France or collaborating with Axis powers”. With such a question, it
came as no surprise that close to 98 per cent of the male population voted to join the
Free French.70 St. Pierre and Miquelon was now under Free French control.
News of Muselier’s action produced “shock” in official circles in Ottawa and
enraged American Secretary of State Cordell Hull, who issued a public statement
labeling the action of the “so-called Free French ships” as “arbitrary”, “contrary to the
agreement of all parties concerned” and “certainly without prior knowledge or
consent in any sense of the U.S. government”. Hull eventually compared the Free
French takeover to Nazi and Japanese aggression and called the action “a violation of
the Monroe Doctrine, a repudiation of the Good Neighbor Policy and a provocation
to war in American waters between Vichy and de Gaulle”. Of greater importance for
Ottawa was the fact that Hull “wished Canada to order the Free French forces away”
and “restore the status quo of these islands”. Canadian diplomats were infuriated at
Hull’s demand, specifying that Canada was not responsible for the Free French action.
According to Jay Pierrepont Moffat, Hull’s communiqué changed official Canadian
attitude from one of “helpful cooperation” to one of “most reluctant cooperation”.71
On Christmas Day, Mackenzie King left Ottawa for Washington for a long-
scheduled conference with Roosevelt and Churchill. The next day he met with both
leaders. Roosevelt immediately asked him where Muselier got the ships to attack the
islands. The Canadian Prime Minister replied that he understood that Muselier “had
come with ships of his own, and it was his own ships he had used for the purpose”.
King added that Canada was “in no way responsible for the Free French occupation
of St. Pierre and Miquelon”. As for Churchill, although he admitted having agreed at
one time to a Free French takeover of the islands, he was quick to specify that he
totally opposed the present action, especially since it was done in complete secrecy
and despite American warnings that no such interventions be undertaken. Churchill
even stated that he was “prepared to take de Gaulle by the back of the neck and tell
him he had gone too far and bring him to his senses”.72
The Americans had some reason to suspect Canadian and British complicity, as the
Free French vessels involved in the action, with the exception of the submarine
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Surcouf, had been supplied by the British in early 1941. They had been loaned to the
Free French to participate in the Battle of the Atlantic, but remained British property.
Moreover, the Newfoundland Escort Force, to which the Free French warships
belonged, was under Canadian command. The fact that Muselier’s task force went
straight to St. Pierre and Miquelon from a Canadian port reinforced American
suspicions. In the end, both the British and Canadians refused to repudiate the Free
French, fearing that this might be detrimental to the Free French movement and the
Allied cause.73
In the aftermath of the invasion, the Allied powers began to fear that Vichy might
send a battle fleet to St. Pierre and Miquelon to recover the colony. In particular, there
was concern that Admiral Georges Robert might order the French Western Atlantic
squadron based at Fort-de-France in Martinique to sail north. At the time, the Vichy
naval fleet in the Caribbean consisted of the aircraft carrier Béarn and its load of
aircraft, the cruisers Jeanne d’Arc and Émile Bertin and several other vessels including
tankers, transports, armed merchant cruisers and fast attack crafts.74 Fear of a Vichy
retaliatory action existed as early as 24 December when Christopher Eberts, Canada’s
Acting Consul in St. Pierre and Miquelon, asked the Canadian naval authorities “to
keep him informed of the movements in North American waters of naval units of the
Vichy government, especially those stationed at Martinique”. Ebert added: “Admiral
[Muselier] states that he does not consider it prudent to permit free movement of
planes in the neighborhood in view of [the] difficulty of identification . . . 
unless he can be guaranteed against possible action by planes of French vessels at
Martinique or by these vessels themselves”.75
On 29 December Hull warned the British government that he anticipated that
Admiral Robert would send a cruiser to St. Pierre and Miquelon to engage the Free
French forces if they were not withdrawn. Both the British and American government
believed that any attempt to restore Vichy control would be accompanied by
bloodshed. In the end, the Vichy government did not attempt any counter-action.76 As
historian Martin Thomas noted: “It was most unlikely that any of Robert’s ships . . .
could have made the voyage to St. Pierre. All of them were suffering the effects of
prolonged inactivity: owing to keels overgrown with barnacles and seaweed, they
could only travel at half their optimum speeds and their fuel consumption on long
journeys was extremely high”. It was also unlikely, Thomas added, that the Vichy
cruisers could have evaded detection by American naval patrols.77 Nevertheless, in
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order to quell the possibility that the St. Pierre and Miquelon crisis would lead to war
with Vichy France, the American government urged de Gaulle to restore the islands’
status quo. When the Free French leader refused, Washington attempted to intimidate
him by mobilizing one cruiser and two destroyers. When British Foreign Secretary
Anthony Eden asked de Gaulle what he would do if the American warships sailed for
St. Pierre and Miquelon, de Gaulle replied that “les navires alliés s’arrêteront à la
limite des eaux territoriales française” and that if they go beyond this limit, “les notres
devraient tirer”.78 By 12 January 1942, the United States even contemplated the
dispatch of a powerful task force, which included the battleship USS Arkansas, to St.
Pierre and Miquelon in addition to exerting economic pressure if de Gaulle refused.79
In the end, Roosevelt felt that the United States could not “afford to send an
expedition to bomb him [Muselier] out” and decided not to intervene.80
As an alternative, Roosevelt managed to work out a compromise, which he thought
would be agreeable to Vichy, the Free French, Great Britain, Canada and the United
States. The Americans, British and Canadians would exercise joint supervision over
the islands, which would be neutralized and demilitarized, while providing personnel
to control the wireless station. Mackenzie King and Churchill agreed with the
proposal.81 On 22 January 1942, Churchill met with de Gaulle and discussed
Roosevelt’s solution. Both agreed that the islands were to remain under Free French
control as long as the present administration of the islands was replaced by a
consultative council. They also agreed that this council appoint American and
Canadian officials to assist in the operation of the wireless station and that the Free
French warships resume their normal duties in the Atlantic. In exchange, the Canadian
and American governments would continue their economic assistance to the islands.82
In late January 1942 Ottawa finally decided to disband Force “Q”, which had been
kept operational at Camp Debert since the summer of 1941. As the Director of
Military Operations and Intelligence stated on 30 December 1941: “It would now
appear doubtful whether Operation “Q” will be undertaken in its present form.
However, as it may be some time before all the complications in connection with the
occupation of these islands by Free French forces are settled, I propose that Operation
“Q” will not now be undertaken on less than seven days notice”.83 On 29 January two
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days after this proposal was implemented, the Chiefs of the General Staff concurred
and decided to finally disband the unit. On 31 January the troops left Camp Debert.84
The St. Pierre and Miquelon affair officially came to an end on 2 February 1942
when Hull declared to Roosevelt “that in view of the paramount importance of
furthering unity and harmony in the maximum cooperative war effort with Great
Britain, Canada and the other United Nations, I recommend that further negotiations
or discussions of the matter be postponed for the period of the war”.85 According to
historians Cecil Lingard and Reginald Trotter, Hull should be blamed for the entire
crisis with the Free French: “The St. Pierre and Miquelon Affair was little more than
a tempest in a teapot blown to undue proportions by Mr. Hull’s wounded pride, by his
determination to continue a Vichy policy of questionable merit, and by his holding to
a policy that involved an inflated conception of United States hegemony in the
western hemisphere”.86 In the end, the Free French remained on the islands for the
duration of the war.87 As historian Milton Viorst put it, “de Gaulle, with three
corvettes and a submarine, had thus defied the most powerful alliance in history and
emerged victorious”.88 The question of St. Pierre and Miquelon gradually faded into
history after February 1942 as Allied forces dealt with more important issues,
especially in the Far East.
In conclusion, Canada’s decision not to occupy the French islands of St. Pierre and
Miquelon between 1940 and 1942 was guided by Ottawa’s diplomatic relations with
Great Britain and the United States. While the British favored a Free French takeover,
the Americans opposed any attempt by foreign nations to interfere with the affairs of
European possessions in the Western Hemisphere. The Havana Conference of 1940
and the Robert-Greenslade/Robert-Horne agreements of 1940-1941 were reflections
of this policy. The United States wanted to maintain the status quo in the Americas
and any attempt by Canada or even Newfoundland to mingle in the affairs of St. Pierre
and Miquelon was sure to be checked. Washington’s position imposed a lot of
pressure on Canada and can explain, in many ways, why Ottawa became hesitant to
launch a unilateral action against the French colony. It was believed in Canadian
diplomatic circles that such an intervention, without American support, might cause
serious diplomatic tension between Canada and the United States and jeopardize the
atmosphere of cooperation. The Free French invasion of St. Pierre and Miquelon in
December 1941, therefore, solved a problem that Canada wanted to correct for more
than a year. As a result, it was de Gaulle and not Mackenzie King who had to explain
the legitimacy of their action to the Americans. In other words, Ottawa kept its hands
clean.
The Free French takeover of these islands solved what could have developed into
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a major threat for Allied shipping. In early December 1941 the German admiralty had
authorized its submarines to operate in North American waters. By early January 1942
Operation Paukenschlag (Drumbeat) was well underway with U-Boats sinking ships
off Canadian and American shorelines.89 Between January and October 1942, for
example, some 30 ships were torpedoed in the Gulf of St. Lawrence alone. As
historian Douglas Anglin explained: “Fortunately, by this time, St. Pierre and
Miquelon were in Allied hands. It is impossible to know whether the enemy would
have made any direct use of the islands if they had remained under Vichy control. The
risk of his trying would, however, have increased considerably”.90 The U-Boat threat,
which became quite visible in early 1942, might have forced the Canadian
government to act and take over control of the French colony to prevent it from being
used by German submariners. In the end, the St. Pierre and Miquelon affair of 1940-
1942 demonstrated how divided the Allied powers were in the early years of the
Second World War, as Canada, the United States and Great Britain all struggled to
come to grips with the existence of the Vichy government and with changing power
relationships within the North Atlantic triangle. Ultimately, the affair provided an
early example of the changing sensibilities in Canadian diplomacy brought on by the
economic and military agreements made with the United States in the early stages of
the war.
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